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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
RICHARD A. ISAACSON,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
CLAIR DORIUS,
Defendant and Appellant,
and
Case No. 18166
LAWRENCE W. LYNN,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
CLAIR DORIUS,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF THE RESPONDENTS
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
In this action the plaintiffs and respondents sought
damages for personal injury and property damages from the defendant arising out 'of a collision between an automobile driven by
the plaintiff-respondent, Lawrence W. Lynn, in which plaintiffrespondent, Richard A. Isaacson, was traveling as a passenger,
and a pickup truck driven by the defendant-appellant, Clair
Darius.

The case

on behalf of each plaintiff was brought as
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a separate action and the cases were consolidated for trial.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
At the trial, after all parties had rested, Judge
Tibbs granted respondents' motion for a directed verdict on the
issue of liability, thereby determining that the defendantappellant was negligent and his negligence the proximate cause
of the collision as a matter of law, and determining that the
plaintiffs-respondents were not negligent and that there conduct was not a proximate cause of the collision.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs-respondents seek to have the decision of
the Trial Court affirmed.
Plaintiffs-respondents also assert that this Court
lacks jurisdiction of this appeal for the reason that defendantappellant did not timely file Notice of Appeal.

This matter was

raised earlier in this Court by motion of respondents seeking
dismissal of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

The Court

denied the motion without prejudice to that issue being raised
as an issue on appealo
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
This action arose out of an automobile collision
between a vehicle driven by the plaintiff, Lawrence W. Lynn, in
which plaintiff, Richard A. Isaacson, was a passenger, and a
pickup truck driven by the defendant.

The collision occurred

on Highway SR28, conunonly known as U. S. Highway 189, just north
of Fayette, Utah, at a place on said highway where a dirt road
leading from Fayette crosses said highway and proceeds on to a
cemetery located on the east side of the highway.

Prior to the

collision the plaintiffs were proceeding north on Highway SR28
(the arterial highway) and the defendant was proceeding east ori
the dirt road.

Travelers on the dirt road are required to stop

at the stop sign before proceeding out onto Highway SR28.

The

defendant testified that he·did not stop at the stop sign, and
that he at no time saw the vehicle driven by the plaintiffs.
(Tr:284)

That defendant's actions were negligent and constituted

a proximate cause of the collision is conceded by the defendant
(Defendant's brief, page 6)0

Defendant, however, contends that

plaintiff Lynn was also negligent on the basis that there was
some evidence plaintiff's vehicle was going 65 miles per hour on
a 55 miles per hour highway (Appellant's brief, page 7) and in
allegedly failing to keep a proper lookout (Appellant's brief,
page 7).
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The facts relating to the foregoing assertions are as
follows:
SPEED: The only testimony in this action with r_espect
to speed came from plaintiff Lynn and from Highway Patrolman David
Bailey (who was qualified at the trial as an accident reconstruction expert) (Tr: 64-66).
Plaintiff Lynn testified that at the time of the collision he was traveling 55 miles per hour.

He testified that

shortly after he and plaintiff Isaacson left Richfield, he set

,,the cruise control on his 1979 Lincoln automobile at 55 miles
per hour and that it remained at that setting until he applied
his brakes after he observed that defendant was not going to
stop for the stop sign as noted above (Tr: 289-80).

Plaintift_Lynn

testified that as soon as he saw that defendant was not going to
stop at the stop sign he immediately applied his brakes, causing
his vehicle to go into a skid which continued until the collision
between the two vehicles and even beyond. (Tr :28]) .
Trooper Bailey testified that from measurements taken
at the scene of the collision and from calculations applied thereto, he determined he was able to arrive at "approximations" of
speed.

(Tr:74).

He concluded that the plaintiff's vehicle was

traveling approximately 65 miles per hour at a point which he
described as "the point of perception: (Tr:74,94)

but that the

formula shed no light on speed prior to that point.

(Tr:94).

He testified that the perception time is approximately 3/4's of
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of a second (Tr:83), during which time, at 65 miles an hour, the
plaintiff's vehicle traveled approximately 74 feet (Tr:84).

Offi-

cer Bailey testified that there was an average of 81 feet of skid
marks prior to impact

~nd

an average of 43 feet after (Tr:68). He

therefore concluded that there were approximately 155 feet traveled by the Lynn vehicle from point of perception to point of
impact.

He testified that the defendant's vehicle was traveling,

at the time of the impact, approximately 18 miles per hour, which
he testified was 26 feet per second (Tr:73,87) and that the distance between the front bumper of defendant's vehicle at impact
and the stop sign through which the said vehicle had passed was
59 feet (Tr:85).

He stated that the defendant would have been

traveling (at 18 miles per hour) for approximately 2.2 seconds
from the time he proceeded past the stop sign to the point of
impact (Tr:91).

Trooper Bailey testified that at 65 miles per

hour plaintiff's vehicle would travel 95 feet per second and at
55 miles per hour it would have traveled 80 feet per second
(Tr: 81).
There was no testimony as to the coefficient of friction on the highway nor as to what other changes, if any, in the
aforesaid reconstruction data would be brought about by a change
in speed in relation to skid distance and/or time and the like.
Trooper Bailey testified that in his opinion the speed
of the Lynn vehicle was not a cause of the collision, but to the
contrary, the cause of the collision was defendant's failure to
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heed the stop sign.

Trooper Bailey states at page 78'of the

transcript:
"In my opinion the cause of the accident was that
Vehicle #2 (the defendant's truck) did not stop at the
stop sign and proceeded into an unsafe intersection."
Defendant claims no error for this question and answer
on appeal.
At pages 79 and 80 of the transcript Trooper Bailey
testified:
"Q
What I'm trying to say is: When you're talking
about going 65 miles an hour contributed as a cause
to this accident, whether it would not have happened
if he was going faster or slower? You have to have
some other factors in there; don't you?
"A
You have to have time.
time equations, yes.

You have to figure in

"Q
But I'm just saying if you'd been going 45 ten
miles under the speed limit, or 65, ten miles over
the speed limit, would Vehicle 1 constituted a hazard
along that highway that whoever was approaching that
stop sign should have stopped for?
"A

Yes.

I would say he should have stopped for it."

Trooper Bailey testified on redirect by Mr. Madsen at
page 93 of the transcript as follows:
"Q
But then, again, we get into matters of the
point of perception it has when braking begins and
so on and there was not just a simple change in
speeds; is that correct?
"A

Yes.

"Q
So it's impossible to say, as I have asked you
originally, whether this accident would have or
wouldn't have occurred had Vehicle #1 been going
55 or 65; is that correct?

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-7-

"A

(No answer).

"Q
You have to have a bunch of other factors involved
besides the simple matter of speed; correct?

"A

Yes, you have to have a point of perception."
On recross by Mr. Jeffs, Trooper Bailey states at

pages 93 and 94 of the record as follows:
"Q
But, aside from that, you still would have, if
he'd been going 55, he would have been further down
the road when Vehicle #2 crossed the highway?
"A
Well, I don't know if I can answer that. All
I can do is go from the point of perception to the
point of impact.
I don't know what his speed was
prior to the point of perception.
I don't know, you
know, he might have been going 100 down the road or
he might have been doing 20.
I don't know."
"Q
But let's assume the same thing that Counsel
asked you when he asked you to assume that that was
a constant 18 miles per hour that Vehicle #2 was
cross.ing the highway. Let's assume a constant 55
miles per hour as he comes from Gunnison. He would
have been further down the road when Vehicle #2
crossed that highway?

at

"A

That's correct.

"Q

And there wouldn't have been any accident?

"A

Probably not."
On redirect Trooper Bailey was asked by Mr. Madsen

at page 94 of the transcript:
"Q
And that's why we'd asked if he had been going
80, he would have been way beyond any possible intersection in this same vein, and that's what you can't
possibly state; correct?
"A

That's correct."
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LOOKOUT:

The testimony with respect to the issue

of lookout on the part of plaintiff Lynn came largely f rorn him.
However, some testimony of the defendant is pertinent to this
issue, although defendant Dorius testified that he at no time
saw the plaintiff's vehicle.

The testimony of Mro Lynn has.been

quoted only in part by the defendant, and in so quoting it, that
testimony has been seriously distorted.

Mr. Lynn's testimony

with regard to the matter starts on page 279 of the record and
we will quote all relevant portions of that testimony.
At pages 279-81 of the transcript, questions are being
put by Mr. Madsen, counsel for plaintiffs, and the answers are
those of Mr. Lynn:
"Q

What happened next?

"A
As we proceeded down the road, I glanced over and
saw a pickup truck corning up towards the road.
This
is Fayette and he was coming across from Fayette to
the cemetery.
"Q
How long or what distance down the road did you
keep that vehicle under observation?
"A
I glanced at it and saw it coming and paid no more
attention to and then, all of a sudden, I realized he
wasn't going to stop.
"Q
When was it and where was he when you realized that
he wasn't going to stop?
"A
Within a hundred or a hundred and twenty feet or
so, I!m not sure.
"Q

Of the road itself?

"A

Of the cross road, right.

"Q

Did you keep him under observation from that point?
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"A
From that point on, I yelled at Dick and I said,
'That knuckle head isn't going to stop, and I'm going
to have to' -- and I slammed on my brakes and they
skidded.
"Q
At the same time you were saying this to Dick,
you're slamming on your brakes?
"A

Absolutely.

"Q
About how fast do you estimate the pickup truck
was going?
"A
Oh, not over 20 or 25.
I mean I'm no authority
on speed when a car is going sideways but he wasn't
speeding; that's for sure.

"Q
Were you able to determine whether he was slowing
down for the stop sign?
"A

I didn't see any effort at all to slow down.

"Q

Was there a stop sign there?

"A

Oh, yes.

"Q

Controlling access to the highway?

"A

Right.

"Q

And you did not see him stop at that stop sign?

"A

No ..

"Q
Did you see him stop at any point during that
100 foot distance?

"A
I didn't. As I observed him, I didn't see any
·stop whatsoever. Although, again, let me say I
didn't exactly keep my eye on him all the time.
I
saw him and then the next time I saw him, I realized
he wasn't going to stop.
"Q
Was there anything obstructing your view of him
at any point along the way?
"A

No way.

I could see him all the time."
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On cross-examination by Mr. ~eff:s~ plaintiff Lynn
testified at pages 306-307 of the transcript as follows:
"Q
And how far back was he from that stop sign
when you first saw him?

"A
1his is conjecture.
I can't tell you for sure,
but it was back maybe a half block or a fourth of a
block or a half a block.
"Q
And do you have any estimate how far you were
from where the collision took place at that time?

"A
Not really.
I had no reason to try to record
the particular position in my mind.
"Q
Well, I recognize that.
I'm just trying to
determine whether you do have any recollection of
that.
You have no estimate of how far back you were?

"A

Not really.

"Q
At the time you did become aware that there was
a circumstance of grave concern you have indicated,
I believe on direct examination that he was back
about 100 feet from the stop sign; is that what you
have testified to?

"A
I didn't know for sure.
don't believe.

I didn't say that, I

"Q
That's what I thought your direct testimony was
that you estimated for Mr. Madsen that he was back
maybe 100 feet before the stop sign.

"A
100 - 75 feet - 125 feet -- this is something
which is strictly an estimation and has to be.
"Q
From the time when you first saw the Darius
pickup truck until the time of the impact, did you
ever become aware of that pickup truck stopping?
"A

Absolutely not.

"Q
Was there a time frame sufficient that it could
have stopped and then re-proceeded without your being
aware of it?
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"A

Very unlikely.

"Q
When you first saw the Darius pickup truck
coming from the west, had you already come up out
of the dip in the road that lies to the south there?
"A
Those dips of yours are so small that you're
not even aware they're there or you're in them when
you're in a car.
"Q

Not aware of any obstruction of your visibility?

"A

There-wasn't any."
Further, with Mr. Jeffs continuing on cross-examination,

plaintiff Lynn testified at page 311 of the transcript:
"Q
What is your best estimate ~s to the distance from
the stop sign of the Darius vehicle when you first became
aware that he was not going to stop at that stop sign?
"A
As I recall he was probably passing the stop sign
itself.

"Q
You didn't become aware until he was actually
passing it?
"A

Until he actually wasn't stopping, yes.

"Q
You didn't see him in the last hundred feet before
that stop sign?
"A
Not -- you probably see someone but you're not
really looking at him; you're not conscious of it,
you're looking at the road.
"Q
Didn't you testify that he didn't make any effort
to slow down for the stop sign?
"A

In my estimation he didn't.

"Q
Is that a conclusion you have drawn by after
the fact or is that from observation?
"A
That's from an observation and from what he said
himself.
I'm quoting him there.
"Q

Well, I'm asking you what you saw.
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"A
Okeh.
I didn't see him slow down and I didn't
see him stop.
I saw him move through the stop sign
at a fairly ~cod rate of speed.
"Q
And at what distance before the stop sign did
you see him proceeding to and through that stop sign?
"A
That's hard to say.
I mean I really, really
wasn't looking over his way particularly but I could
see when I saw him and realized he was coming through,
he was already had his nose coming up toward the stop
sign.
"Q
You didn't pay any particularly attention to him
in that hundred feet before that?
"A
No. You really kind of trust people thinking
they're going to stop when it says to.
"Q
Was there anything between your line of sight and
the Darius vehicle at any time from the time you first
saw him that would have obstructed your vision of him?
"A
I really don't think so. As I've looked at it
since, I could see nothing.
I've been by since, you
know, and I've looked at it and I could see nothing
that could prevent him from seeing anything coming
down the road.
"Q
Was there anything that obstructed your seeing
him?
"A
Well, that's the same question over again.
course not."

Of

On redirect by Mr. Madsen, plaintiff Lynn testified
on page 321 of the transcript:
"Q
Calling your attention to your observations of the
pickup truck, had the pickup truck stopped and had its
driver gotten out to pick something up, would you have
seen that? Were you that aware of the truck at this
time?
"A
I was down the road about a mile and a half.
couldn't have seen it.
"Q

I

Did it so stop and did the driver get out at any
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time under your observation?
"A

Absolutely not."
Plaintiff Lynn testified that after the collision he

had a conversation with defendant Darius, at which time Dorius
stated to him:
"Gee, I'm sorry.
I didn't see you.
stop; it was all my fault." (Tr:284).

I didn't

In his own testimony Darius confirmed that that statement was accurate (Tr:332).
Mr. Darius testified that he was proceeding east on
the dirt road approaching Highway SR28, that he stopped on the
highway, left his vehicle running and got out and removed a limb
from the highway (Tr:326).

He stated that it took him "probably

ten seconds" to bring "the vehicle to a stop, get out and move
the limb and get back into the vehicle."

(Tr:329).

He stated

that he stopped for the limb at a distance of at least 100 feet
west of an electrical substation situated beside the dirt road
and that·the substation was s'Omewhere between 40 and 100 feet
west of the stop sign, so that ·the limb was between 140 and 200
feet west of the stop sign (not 40 or 50 feet as stated at page 3
of appellant's brief) (Tr:353).
Defendant was asked by his counsel on direct examination,
"Did you consider the stopping to get the limb the
equivalent of stopping for the stop sign?"
to which Mr. Darius stated:
"Yes, I did."

(Tr: 354-6)
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He further stated on direct examination by Mr. Jeffs
(Tr:340-341):
"Q
(By Mr. Jeffs)
Your answer is: There was never
a time that a vehicle could be completely obscured from
coming from the south?
"A
Not where I was stopped. There was no reason why
I couldn't have seen something.

"Q
Okeh.
Do you have any explanation for why, as
you got back in your vehicle, that you did not see the
Lynn vehicle coming from the south?
"A
Well, I think something must have obscured my view
in the truck, either the post on the door, the mirror
on the side of the truck, as I was going on, something.
We must have been going in the same area, so that when
I looked out there, he must have been there but the
mirror or the post must have covered it. The circumstances were that he was there but I couldn't see him
because of some object that was in the truck itself.
"Q
Now, what are you talking about when you say the
post?
"A
The door post, where the window is, it's part of
a door or part of the window or possibly it was the
rear view mirror or something.
"Q

The rear view mirror that's on the right hand side?

"A

Yes."
On cross-examination by Mr. Madsen, the transcript

discloses the following testimony by defendant at page 356:

"Q
Now, let me be sure I have it in sequence.
You
looked to the south at the time you got back in the
car and started across SR-28?
"A

Right ..

"Q

And did not look at the south again until impact?

"A

I

didn't ever look again evidently.
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"Q
Did you look to the north at the time you got
back into the truck after removing the limb?
"A

Yes, certainly.

"Q
Did you look to the north again after that first
view until the accident?
"A

I really can't remember what I did.

"Q
When you indicated my client, as you referred to
him, told the truth when he indicated in a conversation
specifically. Do you remember telling him you did not
stop for the stop sign?
"A
I knew I felt bad for having run out in front of
them.
"Q

Answer the question.

"A
I feel like what they said is as close as I can
recall what was said.

"Q
Specifically, do you recall telling them you did
not stop for the stop sign?
"A
I remember the conversation with the officer
I don' t remember saying that particular thing.

but

"Q

Do you remember telling them that you were at fault?

"A

I think they told the truth when they said that.

"Q

I'm asking you what you remember that you said?

"A
I had received a pretty bad bump on the head.
I'm
sure I was just going on because they both had their,
you know --

"Q
Are you trying to suggest that you don't really
clearly remember what was it he said in that conversation?
"A
I know the gist of what he said at this time but
being a year later, I would agree with them that is what
was said.
"Q
They have testified you told them that you didn't
see the stop sign and didn't stop for it and you were
sorry and that it was your fault.
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"A
Well, I haven't heard a dishonest thing from
then yet and I would go on just that."
After both sides had rested, the plaintiffs made a
motion for a directed V.erdict on the issue of liability_ of the
grounds that there was no evidence that any purported negligence
on the part of plaintiff Lynn was a proximate cause of the collision in question.

That matter was argued to the Court, and

the Court granted the motion and stated that he felt there was
no evidence of negligence.

The Court stated (Tr:391}:

"The Court is of the opinion, and so finds, that
the defendant is negligent and that the plaintiffs
are not negligent, and the Court grants a directed -will direct the jury to just determine the iss~e of
damages."
The Court further added:
"For the purpose of the record, the Court finds
further that likewise there is no proximate cause,
but I don't find that there is any negligence and
so I don't think it makes any difference."
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TIMELINESS OF APPEAL:

The facts relating to the time-

liness of defendant's appeal are as follows:
After entry of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
and Judgment, the defendant filed a Motion for New Trial.

Briefs

were filed by the parties relating thereto, and the matter was
argued orally before Judge Tibbs in Manti.

Judge Tibbs denied

the Motion for New Trial and Order Denying Motion for New Trial
was entered in the Register of Actions on November 13, 1981.
(R:95,179) (See also Affidavit of Wanda Bartholomew, Deputy County
Clerk of Sanpete County, filed in the Supreme Court in connection
with Motion to Dismiss Appeal for Lack of Jurisdiction.)
Thus the time for appeal began to run on November 13,
1981, and would have been up on December 13, 1981 (one month
later), but the 13th was a Sunday, so that the last day of the
one-month appeal time was December 14, 1982.

Defendant actually

fil-ed his Notice of Appeal in the District Court of Sanpete
County on December 16, 1981, two days late (R:97,181).
On or about December 31, 1981, respondents made a
motion in this Court to dismiss the appeal of the defendant for
lack of jurisdiction.
January 18, 1982.

That motion was heard by this Court on

At that time the Court denied the Motion to

Dismiss the Appeal, but denied the same "without prejudice to
raise as an issue on appeal."
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-18ARGUMENT
POINT I.

THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT ANY NEGLIGENCE

OF THE PLAINTIFFS WAS A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE COLLISION.
SPEED.

Defendant attempts to establish negligent spee

1

on the part of the plaintiffs by reference to Sec.· 41-6-46 (2) (c)
In Cardon v. Brenchley, 575 P2d 184 (Utah 1978), this Court discussed the matter of prima facie evidence of negligent speed.
The Court there stated:
"The overriqing principal governing negligence
is the exercise of the degree of care which an ordinary,
reasonable person would exercise under the circumstances.
In order for the plaintiff to recover, she must show that
the defendant was negligent in failing to exercise that
degree of care; and also that his negligence was the proximate
cause of the collision."
Defendant has the burden of proof to establish that plaintiffs'
speed was negligent and that such speed, if negligent, was a
proximate cause of the collision.

Defendant fails on both counts

There is no showing in this case that plaintiffs'
55 or 65 or anything in

between~amounted

speed~either

to negligence under the

circumstances of this case, but furthermore there is no showing
whatsoever that the plaintiffs' speed was a proximate cause of
the collision.
In his brief defendant mentions the word "causation"
once on page 6 of the brief, but nowhere refers to any evidence
whatever from which it could be concluded that speed in any way
caused the collision.

There simply is no such evidence.

The thrust of defendant's speed argument is found in
his brief (page 8), where he asserts that "speed was a factor in
the accident."

He there quotes from Trooper Bailey ((Tr:94) (in

response to a question by Mr. Jeffs:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-19"Let's assume a constant 55 mile per hour as he
comes from Gunnison. He would have been further down
the road when Vehicle #2 crossed that highway."
To which Trooper Bailey answered:
"That's correct."
But, if we assume a constant speed of 75 or 85 miles
per hour, we would have to acknowledge that plaintiff would have
been way past the point of impact at the time in question.

It

is obvious that such reasoning is specious and totally irrelevant.
Trooper Bailey's own testimony was that his calculations shed no
light upon the speed of the Lynn vehicle prior to point of perception.

There is therefore no testimony whatsoever from any

source that plaintiff Lynn was exceeding 55 miles per hour prior
to the point of perception, which was his speed by his own
testimony.
There are numerous cases in which the aforesaid "speed"
argument of defendant has been rejected.

We refer the Court to the case of Larson v. Evans,
364 P2d 1088 (1961)
12 Ut 2d 245/. That case involved a fact situation similar to the
instant case.

In that case the trial court had submitted to the

jury the issue of plaintiff's contributory negligence and denied
a motion for a new trial on the part of the plaintiff on the
grounds that the jury could not reasonably find that plaintiff's
speed was a proximate cause of the accident.

The Supreme Court

of Utah noted that there was evidence submitted which would support a finding that the speed of the Larson vehicle was in
excess of 30 miles per hour and noted that evidence of plaintiff's speed was irrelevant to the question of his negligence
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in the absence of a showing that such speed violated some duty
which he might have had under the circumstances.

The court

noted at page 239:
"Not only did the defendant fail to show that John
Larson was negligent in the speed at wh~ch he was ·
traveling, but he failed also to show any causal connection between plaintiff's speed and the accident."
(Emphasis added.)
The same can be said of the facts of this case as the
defendant has toally failed to show any causal connection between
plaintiff's speed and the collision which occurred in this action
In the case of Smith v. United States, 94 F.Supp. 681

•

(U.S. Dist. Court, W.D. No. Carolina, Charlotte Div., 1951) the
facts involve a situation where the plaintiff ran a stop sign
and proceeded from a secondary road onto a favored highway, there
colliding with a vehicle being driven on the main highway by the
defendant.

Plaintiff contended that the defendant was speeding.

The court stated that even if i t were to be assumed that the
defendant had been speeding, still such speeding was not a proximate cause of the accident.

The court stated:

"If one would assume that the automobile of the
defendant was being operated too rapidly or in violation
of the speed regulations of North Carolina in force and
effect as of the date of the collision, still it could
hardly be said that the rate of speed would have been
the proximate cause of the alleged injury of the plaintiff or the damage to his property.
Undoubtedly, the
cause of plaintiff's injury is predicated upon his
driving out from a secondary roadway into the highway
into the face of oncoming traffic."
In Kane v. Williams, 181 A.2d 651 (Maryland 1962),the
court of Appeals of Maryland upheld the granting of a motion for
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directed verdict.

In that case the appellant, an 11-year-old,

was riding a bicycle and ran a stop sign and proceeded out into
the highway.

The

appell~nt

claimed that the motorist who col-

lided with the 11-year-old was driving at an excessive rate of
speed.

The court held as a matter of law that the negligence of

the cyclist was the proximate cause of the accident.

The court

stated:
"On the theory that the defendant was traveling
too fast in a school zone on a school day and at a time
when children were going to school a·nd should therefore
have foreseen what happended, the infant plaintiff
further suggests that he should not be charged with
contributory negligence as a matter of law, but his
argument is not sound under the circumstances. For
here, where the defendant had the right of way, and the
movements of the inf ant plaintiff were the proximate
cause of the accident, it would be mere conjecture to
say that the cyclist might not have been struck if the
motorist had been driving slower and had exercised more
foresight."
In Chiasson v. Connecticut, 144 So.2d 726 (Louisiana
1962), the fact situation was presented in which the driver of
a car approaching a through highway stopped at a stop sign and
then proceeded cautiously into the intersection.

The trial court

had held that both that driver and the driver of the vehicle on
the main highway were guilty of negligence.

There was some

testimony in that action that the driver of the vehicle on the
main highway was exceeding the speed limit.

The appellate court

held that the evidence of such alleged excessive speed was not
sufficient, but stated further:
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"Moreover if the station wagon was traveling at
approximately 5 miles per hour as the trial judge found
and if in fact the accident occcurred while Orgeron was
going 40 miles per hour it still would have occurred
had he been going only 30 miles per hour.
It follows
that his speed was not a proximate cause of the
accident
"We might indulge in all sorts of mathematical calculations in an endeavor to determine whether Orgeron
could have stopped in time to avoid the accident after
he saw·or should have seen the station wagon, and all
of the calculations would ultimately be based on the
estimates of speed and distance testified to by Mrs.
Chiasson and Orgeron.
In our opinion the proof is
insufficient to show that Orgeron could have avoided
the accident."
We believe in the instant case there is likewise
insufficient evidence to show that any difference in speed would
have had a different result in this case.

It should further be noted that there is a serious
danger in attempting to determine with mathematical precision
stopping distance, reaction times and the like based upon estimates only.

As was noted in the case of Mulbach v. Hertig,

15 Ut 2d 121, 388 P2d 414

(1964):

"Defendant's counsel has proceeded from estimates
as to speeds and distance to precise refinements down
to fractions of seconds of time and feet and inches
of distance to demonstrate that at the time defendant
was at the stop sign the plaintiff must have been at
sufficient distance away that he could have stopped
or so controlled his truck as to avoid the collision.
No useful purpose would be served by setting forth and
analyzing these niceties.
It may well be that had
plaintiff kept a constant watch directly upon the
defendant and nothing else, he might in some manner
have avoided this accident. But in the exercise of
due care he could not very well do so, but was
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obliged to be alert to other possible dangers on the
highway and particularly at the intersection."
We believe the same argument can be made in the instant
case.
Finally, we cite to the Court the case of Davis v.
Brooks, 186 F.Supp. 366 (U.S. Dist. Court, Dist. of Delaware, _1960).
In that case the plaintiff's decedent ran a stop sign and proceeded out into the highway at an excessive rate of speed, there
colliding with a truck driven by the defendant.

There was evi-

dence that the truck had been exceeding the speed limit slightly.
The court held at page 368:
"The first question for decision is whether Massie
was guilty of any negligence which was a proximate cause
of the accident. If not, that is an end to the matter.
He was going slightly, very slightly, in excess of the
legal limit. This was negligence per se. But was this
excess speed of two miles per hour over the statute a
proximate cause of the accident? The point of inquiry
is whether this accident would have ever happened at
all but for the incredibly reckless operation of the
plaintiff's machine, bearing in mind that even had the
defendant's truck been stopped, the accident would have
still happened. Thus viewed, it is apparent that the
sole cause of the accident was the reckless negligence
of the plaintiff Davis."
(Emphasis added.)
It was established without question that the defendant's
truck was moving at approximately 47 miles per hour, and it is
thus clear that where the court states that the accident would
have happened anyway, the court is assuming that the defendanthad
to be deemed to be at the point of impact in that case in any
event.

The court has thus concluded that it is irrelevant to

talk in terms of the speed of the truck as being slower or faster
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than the speed limit in terms of proximity to the accident,
obviously for the same reasons as we have heretofore pointed
out~that a difference in speed ~ould have placed the defendant

at a different location entirely from that at which this coliisic
occurred.

Thus a difference in the defendant's speed might ina

philosophical sense be considered to be a cause of the accident
inasmuch as a driver's speed, whatever it is, is the speed necessary to bring him to the point of impact.

But the point is that

speed is not a proximate cause of the accident just because it
is the speed that brings the motorist to the point of impact.
In order for the speed to become a proximate cause, it must be
shown by the weight of the evidence that the speed under the
facts of a given case somehow contributed to the accident in
some way other than simply showing that that was the necessary
speed to bring the motorist to the point of impact.
There .is no evidence whatsoever in this action that
the plaintiff's speed in any way contributed to the collision in
question.

The Court was entirely justified in so holding as a

matter of law, and indeed, we believe, was required to do so
under the facts of this case.
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LOOKOUT:

With respect to the matter of lookout,

plaintiff Lynn testified that he first saw defendant's vehicle
when it was one-fourth to one-half a block west of the highway
(Tr:306).

As noted in Mulbach v. Hertig, supra, plaintiff was

not required to keep a "constant watch directly upon the defendant and nothing else" thereafter.

As noted in that case, in the

exercise of due care he could not do that, but was obliged to be
alert to other possible dangers on the highway and particularly
at the intersection.

We believe that the testimony with regard

to the lookout maintained by plaintiff Lynn more than meets that
standard.

The testimony of Mr. Lynn discloses:
1.

Lynn observed the defendant's vehicle when it was

between 75 and 125 feet from the stop sign (Tr:306) ·
It should be noted that the stop sign was approximately 59 feet
from the point of impact, which indicates that p1aintiff L.ynn
clearly saw the vehicle west of the stop sign.
2.

Plaintiff Lynn observed that the defendant did

not stop at the stop'sign (Tr:279-281), and plaintiff
Lyrintestified that he first became aware that Darius was not
going to stop at the stop sign when Deritis was "probably passing
the stop sign

itself.'~

(Tr:311)

He further testified that he

saw that. the defendant did not slow down, saw that he did not
stop and saw that he moved through the stop sign at a "fairly
(Tr: 311)
good rate of speed. 11 / At another place in his testimony, he puts
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the speed at approximately 20 miles per hour (Tr:280).
3.

Plaintiff Lynn

testified that he did not see the

defendant stop his truck and get out of it and remove the limb
from the road, or any such action (Tr: 3 21) .
He testified that when he realized that defendant

4o

was not going to stop, the defendant "already had his nose coming
up toward the stop sign."
5.

(Tr:311).

Plaintiff Lynn testified that, after observing

that defendant was not going to stop for the stop sign, he "yelled
at" his companion in the car: "That knuckle head isn't going to
stop" and "slammed on his brakes."(Tr:280)
It is thus clear that plaintiff Lynn kept the defendant
under frequent and repeated observation from the time he first
noticed him.

This observation was not constant, but it was

reasonable and prudent under the circumstances.

In view of the

defendant's rather moderate speed, there was nothing that the
defendant did until he actually didn't stop that would have
alerted plaintiff to any danger.

It is possible that had the

defendant been speeding, that the plaintiff might have been on
notice earlier that the defendant was not going to stop and/or
could not stop.

However, at a speed of 20 miles an hour (and

Trooper Bailey places the speed at 18 miles per hour at impact)
there was no circumstance to alert the plaintiff to danger until
plaintiff reached the stop sign and failed to stop for the same.
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The testimony is undisputed that plaintiff was watching the
defendant at that point and thereafter.
Defendant would have us believe that plaintiff Lynn
was required to assume that defendant would not observe the stop
sign.

Utah law is directly to the contrary.

Plaintiff had a

right to assume that defendant would observe the law until such
time as a contrary result was evident.
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It is thus clear that plaintiff Lynn is only required
to be aware of the danger at that point when it was clear that
defendant was not going to stop, but rather was going to proceed
out on to the highway in a collision course with plaintiff.
There is no evidence whatsoever in this action that
Lynn did not keep a reasonable and proper lookout, and to have
submitted the matter to the jury on that issue would have been
clearly error.
At the trial, and also in his brief, defendant spends
considerable time discussing the matter of the limb on the road.
We believe that discussion to be nothing more thana"red herring"
and to be totally irrelevant.

Even if defendant did stop 140 to

200 feet west of the stop sign, it would not constitute a stop
for the stop sign under any view of this case.

The fact that

defendant deemed it to be a stop at the stop sign shows only
total lack of judgment.

Further, it appears that the defendant

is attempting to infer that since the plaintiff did not see the
defendant stop, the plaintiff was somehow not keeping a proper
lookout.

By defendant's own testimony, it took him ten seconds

to stop, get out of the truck, remove the limb and get back into
the truck.

He then had a minimum of 140 feet to travel to the

stop sign.

At 18 miles per hour (26 feet per second), i t would

take him another 5.4 seconds minimum to get to the stop sign.
F'urthermore, since he would

be

accelerating from a stop, i t

would no doubt take a second or two longer than that.
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Thus, it is clear that a minimum of approximately 18
seconds elapsed between the so-called stopping of the vehicle
for the limb and defendant's reaching the stop sign.

If plain-

tiff was traveling 55 miles an hour, then working backwards 18
seconds from point of impact would place the plaintiff at least
1,440 feet south of the point of impact (18 seconds times 80
feet per second).

At 65 miles per hour times 18 seconds, the

plaintiff would be down the highway 1,720 feet (95 feet per
second times 18 seconds).
It appears unlikely that· the defendant could stop his
truck, get out of it, remove a limb and get back into it in the
10 seconds he indicates.

It would appear likely that it would

take considerably longer than that, probably a minimum of 20 to
30 seconds.

If that is so, it would place the plaintiff Lynn

even further down the highway.
Thus, it is evident that it would not be unusual for
a driver not to particularly take notice of someone stopping on
a dirt road in excess of 1,440 feet (or 1,710 or more feet) down
the highway.

Whether a driver would notice such conduct at that

distance is pure speculation, and in any event would not be negligence nor indicate any lack of attention.

For the Court to have

submitted that matter to the jury would simply have permitted
the jury to speculate on a totally irrelevant matter.
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Defendant cites a number of cases in his brief
standing for the proposition that the driver who has the rightof-way cannot, because of his favored status, totally ignore
everything else that is happening on the road in front of him.
Those cases are collected generally in defendant's brief on
pages 11 to 21.
sition.

We do not quarrel with the aforesaid propo-

However, those cases are inapplicable in this case

because the uncontroverted evidence is that the plaintiff Lynn
kept a reasonable lookout at all times.

Furthermore, canvassing

those cases cited by the defendant reveals that each one is fac•
tually very different from the instant case.
Country Club Foods v. Barney, 10 Ut 2d 317, 352 P2d
776

(1960) , involved a case where the favored driver initially

saw the other vehicle when it was a considerable distance away,
and didn't see it again "until a split second before the impact."
The trial judge sitting as a factfinder in that case found that
there might be some negligence inherent in that circumstance,
but held that any such negligence was not a proximate cause of
the collision.
In the instant case plaintiff Lynn was aware of defendant when he was one-fourth to one-half a block away and almost
continually from the time he was 75 to 100 feet away.

He testi-

fied that he was only alerted to the fact that defendant was not
going to stop at the stop sign until he in fact did not stop for it.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-31-

As soon as he was aware that defendant intended to violate the
law, he applied his brakes.

There can be no negligence nor

causation in those facts.
In Sine v. Salt Lake Transp. Co. et al., 106 Ut 289,
147 P2d 875 (1944), the favored driver had entered the intersection before he ever saw the other driver, who was then 50
feet away going 40 miles per hour.

The favored driver testified

that he assumed the other would stop, but he did not look again
until "just at the moment of impact.

11

There was no stop sign

involved and that case presents a totally different fact picture than the instant case.
In Gren v. Norton, 117 Ut 121, 213 P2d 356 (Utah 1949),
the favored driver proceeded past a stop sign at a time when the
other driver was 250 feet north of the intersection.

The favored

driver never again looked until "about 10 feet east of the point
of collision."
In Hickok v. Skinner, 113 Ut 1, 190 P2d 514 (1948), the
court states in effect that once a driver notices another car
which is a potential hazard, the first driver cannot ignore the
other vehicle completely thereafter.

In that case the favored

driver stopped at the stop sign, observed the other car a considerable distance from the intersection and the favored driver
proceeded through the intersection, but never again looked at
the other vehicle.
In Johnson v. Syme, 6 Ut 2d 319, 313 P2d 468 (1957),
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the favored driver never saw the other vehicle at all, even
though the other vehicle had lights burning.
In Thurman v. Partridge, 8 Ut 2d 9, 326 P2d 1024 (1958)
the street was covered with six inches of .snow.

The Court held

that it could not say as a matter of law that the favored driver
was not negligent.

This was apparently based upon the speed of

the favored driver in the light of the fact that there was six
inches of snow on the ground and that neither driver was able to
control his vehicle at the speeds at which they were going.
In Richards v. Anderson, 9 Ut 2d 17, 337 P2d 59 (1959)
the favored driver never saw the other vehicle "until he was a
few feet" from him.

The Court concluded in that case that the

favored driver had ample opportunity to observe and avoid the
other vehicle.
Anderson v. Bradley, 590 P2d 339 (Utah 1979) involved
an auto-pedestrian collision on Sunnyside Avenue.

In that case

the favored pedestrian was crossing the street, and there was
testimony the pedestrian "didn't seem to be aware that a car was
bearing down on him", which presented a case where there was evidence from which negligence of the favored pedestrian could be
determined.
Lamkin v. Lynch, 600 P2d 530 (Utah 1979) presented a
case where the evidence disclosed that neither the driver nor
the pedestrian saw the other.

The pedestrian had dark clothing

and it was a dark, cloudy day.

That case obviously presented a
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situation which was proper for jury determination on comparative
negligence.
In Little America Refining v. Leyba et al., 641P2d112
(Utah 1982) the trial court directed a verdict of no liability as
to defendant Heimberg apparently on the basis that the evidence
disclosed that the Leyba vehicle had hit or pushed the Heimberg
vehicle into plaintiff's gas pumps and that Heimberg was thus an
innocent third party.

The Supreme Court however held that there

was evidence from which a factual determination could be madethat
Leyba and Heimberg had been racing down Victory Road, and that
that circumstance, if true, could constitute a proximate cause.
Conklin v. Walsch, 113 Ut 276, 193 P2d 437 (1948)
involved a case in which a full stop was made before entering
the highway.

Furthermore, the favored driver, although he noted

the other driver on one occasion, never thereafter observed the
other driver at any time.
In Badger v. Clayson, 18 Ut 2d 329, 422 P2d 665 (1967)
there was a collision at a "blind intersection" for the two vehicles
in question.

It was a matter of a changing right-of-way situa-

tion affected by the traffic light and the language quoted by
appellant that under such traffic device, changing conditions
must be observed, is good law, but not applicable here since we
are dealing with a permanent traffic regulator in the form of a
stop sign, not a changing one.

Moreover, the party in that case

who had the right-of-way admitted he did not look to the left to
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see whether the defendant was or was not coming because of the
obstructed corner.

The case is helpful in that i t makes clear

that the favored driver can rely on the other driver observing
the law until he "sees, or in the exercise of reasonable care
should have seen, that the other vehicle is going to proceed
against the s.ignal. "
Martin v. Stevens, 121 Ut 484, 243 P2d 747 (1952) is
another "blind intersection" accident where there was no traffic
control device, and again we agree with so much of the case as
quoted by appellant as being good law in that fact situation,
but not helpful here.
In the case of Yoshitaro Okuda v. Rose, 5 Ut 2d 39,
296 P2d 287 (1956) there was a pedestrian-automobile accident at
night involving circumstantial evidence which of course required
a factfinder, and the case is not helpful in the instant fact
situation.
Appellant cites Kim v. Anderson, 610 P2d 1270 (1980)
wherein this court states:
"The trial court is to examine the evidence in the
light most favorable to the party against whQm a directed
verdict motion is made."
We do not quarrel with that law, but point out merely
that this action was a medical malpractice case where a dentist
dropped a drill bit down the throat of his patient. Presenting
the issue of whether or not there had been adequate evidence from
medical experts on the standard of care in the profession is
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not helpful in the instant fact situation.
In Bates v. Burns, 3 Ut 2d 180, 281 P2d 209 (1955),
although it appears that the favored driver was essentially
without fault, he did not see the other driver until the
favored driver was well into the intersection, thus presenting
a jury question on his contributory negligence.
It is thus evident that the cases relied upon by
defendant generally involved belated observation by the favored
driver or cases where the favored driver observed the other
driver at some considerable distance from the point of impact
and thereafter totally disregarded the existence of the other
driver.

This is not at all the fact situation involved in

the instant case.
At page 16 of his brief defendant refers to Section
41-6-71, Utah Code Annotated, and attempts to rely on the provisions thereof.

The problem is that that section gives the

driver stopping at a stop sign no rights until he has stopped.
At that time he can proceed provided there are no
consituting an immediate hazard.

other vehicles

In the instant case the testi-

mony is uncontroverted that the defendant never stopped at the
stop sign.

He stopped some 140 feet prior to the stop sign, but

that cannot be construed as a stop under any circumstances.
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At page 4 of defendant's brief he asserts:
"The defendant-appellant was proceeding from his
stopped position across the arterial highway and at
the time of impact had reached 18 miles per hour."
There is no basis in the facts for that assertion
whatsoever.

The so-called "stopped position" was 140 feet from

the stop sign and is no more starting out across the highway
from a stopped position than could be claimed for Mr. Darius
starting out from his home from a stopped position and then
proceeding across the arterial highway later in the day.

It

is a statement absolutely without basis in fact.
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POINT II.

DEFENDANT'S NOTICE OF APPEAL WAS NOT

TIMELY.
Order Denying Motion for New Trial was entered in the
Register of Actions on November 13, 1981.

Notice of Appeal

should have been filed within one month thereof, to-wit, on
December 13, 1981.

Since December 13 was a Sunday, the filing

deadline was extended to December 14, 1981.

The Notice of

Appeal was not filed until December 16 (two days late) and
therefore the appeal was not timely and should be dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction.
The time for filing notice of appeal to the Supreme
Court is governed by Rule 73, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The
relevant portions of that rule are as follows:
(a)
"When an appeal is permitted from a district
court to the Supreme Court, the time within which an
appeal may be taken shall be one month from the date
of the entry in the Register of Actions of the judgment
or order appealed from unless a shorter time is provided by law . . .
"The running of the time for appeal is terminated
by a timely motion pursuant to any of the rules hereinafter enumerated, and the full time for appeal fixed
in this subdivision commences to run and is to be computed from the date of the entry in the Register of
Actions of any of the following orders made upon a
timely motion under such rules: . . . denying a motion
for a new trial under Rule 59.
"A party may appeal from a judgment by filing with
the district court a notice of appeal, together with
sufficient copies thereof for mailing to the Supreme
Court and all other parties to the judgment, and
depositing therewith the fee required for docketing
the appeal in the Supreme Court. The clerk of the
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district court shall forthwith transmit one copy of
the notice of appeal, showing the date of filing,
together with the required fee, to the Supreme Court
where the appeal shall be duly docketed.
Failure of
the appellant to take any of the further steps to
secure the review of the judgment appealed from does
not affect the validity of the appeal, but is ground
only for such remedies as are specified in this rule
or, when no remedy is specified, for such action as
the Supreme Court deems appropriate, which may include
dismissal of the appeal.
(Emphasis added.)
(b)
~The notice ~f appeal shall specify the parties
taking the appeal; shall designate the judgment or
part thereof appealed from; and shall designate that
the appeal is taken to the Supreme Court. Notification
of the filing of the notice of appeal shall be given by
appellant serving a copy [copies] thereof on all the
parties to the judgment. The notification to a party
shall be given by serving a copy of the notice of
appeal on his attorney of record or, if the party is
not represented by an attorney, then on the party at
his last known address, and such notification is sufficient notwithstanding the death of the party or his
attorney prior to the giving of the notification."
(Emphasis added.)
It is clear that Rule 73 provides that the appeal
must be taken within one month fron entry in the Register of
Actions and the notice of appeal must be filed, not merely
mailed within that period of time.

Although it states half

way through the third paragraph of Rule 73 (a) that f·ailure to take
"further steps" is not jurisdictional, this clearly indicates
that the matters which precede that declaration in the said
section, to-wit, the "one month" requirement and the "filing"
requirement are both jurisdictional.
There is a provision in subparagraph (b) of Rule 73
relating to appellant's mailing copies of notice of appeal.
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Since the mailing requirement appears after the clause
describing nonjurisdictional matters, the mailing itself
would appear to be nonjurisdictional, but this only emphasizes
the fact that the filing within one month is jurisdictional.
In sununary, the filing within one month appears to be
clearly jurisdictional, whereas the mailing of copies is not
considered such.

Rule 73 has not been amended in the particulars

noted since its original adoption (although it has been amended
with relation to other matters).
Utah case law, without exception, has interpreted the
one month filing requirement as jurisdictional.
In Anderson v. Anderson; 3 Ut 2d 277, 282 P2d 845,
the order appealed from was entered on February 23, 1954.

On

March 23, 1954, defendant served upon counsel for plaintiffs a
notice of appeal to the Supreme Court, but did not present it to
the clerk for filing until March 24.

At page 279 of the opinion

our Supreme Court refers to Rule 73(a), URCP, and sets forth in
italics the phrase which we have referred to above, "by filing
with the district court."

The Court then states the following

at page 280, clearly showing failure to file is jurisdictional:
"The purpose of this Rule to make jurisdictional
a failure to file the notice of appeal on time is clearly
evident by the special provision therein that:
"'Failure of the appellant to take any of the further steps to secure the review of the judgment appealed
from does not affect the validity of the appeal, but is
ground only for such remedies as are specified in this
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rule or, when no remedy is specified, for such action
as the Supreme Court deems appropriate, which may
include dismissal of the appeal. 1 (Italics suppl·ied.)
"In the cause In re Estate of Lynch (Brennan v.
Lynch), Utah, 254 P.2d 454, we held:
"'Rule 73, Utah Rules·of Civil Procedure, requires
an appeal to be taken within one month from the entry
of the judgment appealed from . . . and that a party
may appeal from a judgment by filing with the district
court a notice of appeal. 111
In In re Estate of Ratliff, 19 Ut 2d 346, 431 P2d 571,
the Order Denying Motion for New Trial was entered March 1, 1966,
and the Court stated at page 348:.
"Under Rule 73(a), U.R.C.P.,
appellant had one
month from that date or until April 1, 1966, in which
to file her notice of appeal."
The

Cou~t

then goes on the state that the notice of

appeal was received for filing in the office of the County Clerk
on April 1, 1966, but inasmuch as it was not accompanied by the
filing fee, was not filed until a later date.

The Court then

concluded at page 349:
"Since the notice was filed more than one month
after the entry of judgment or the order appealed from
(Rule 73(a), U.R.C.P.), this court lacks jurisdiction
to entertain the appeal, and is therefore compelled
to order a dismissal thereof .. "
Albrecht v. Uranium Services, Inc., 596 P2d. 1025 (Utah
1979) (reversed on other grounds at 607 P2d 836) is a case cited
by appellant at oral argument in this matter on respondents'

Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

In that case, this

court held that where the order appealed from was entered in the
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Register of Actions on July 5, 1978, that notice of appeal
filed on August 7, 1978, was timely because August 5 was a
Saturday and appellant therefore had until the following Monday
in which to file the appeal.

We do not see how this helps the

defendant because in the instant case the one-month period ended
on a Sunday, and we have conceded that the appellant had until
the following Monday in which to file the appeal; however, this
appeal was not filed until two days later, to-wit, on Wednesday.
At page 1026 of the Albrecht case the Court stated:
"Respondent states the time commenced to run
July 5, 1978 (we assume it to have been entered in the
Register of Actions on that day) , and Notice of Appeal
was not filed until August 7, 1978. The filing was
timely because August 5, 1978, fell on a Saturday,
and the following Monday was the next day not
excluded by Rule 6, U.R.C.P.· 11
It should be noted that the Court here again talks in
terms of filing, not in terms of mailing.
On page 1027 of the decision in Albrecht, this Court
states as follows:
"For example, if the judgment or order appealed
from were to be entered in the Register of Actions on
the 6th of July, the last day on which a Notice of
Appeal could be filed would be the 6th of August,
unless such 6th of August fell on 'a Saturday, a
Sunday, or a legal holiday.'
In such latter event,
the period would run 'until the end of the next day
which is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal
holiday."
In addition we refer the Court to the following cases
which hold in accordance with the foregoing:

Peay v. Peay, at
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607 P2d 841 (Utah 1980), and Bigelow v. Ingersoll, 618 .P2d 50,
(Utah 1980).
Chapter 37 of Title 63, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
as amended, is not applicable to filing of appeal in the
Supreme Court.
At said oral argument of this matter the defendant
cited to the court as governing the time for filing notices
of appeal Chapter 37 of Title 63.

The thrust of that chapter

is that reports, claims and other documents' of the type there
enumerated are deemed filed when they are postmarked.

It also

provides that the date of registration or certification shall
be deemed the post-marked date and also provides that such an
item will be deemed filed if the sender "establishes by competent evidence' that the item was deposited in the United States
Mail on or before the date for filing or paying.
It is clear that Chapter 37 was never intended to
govern appeals to the Supreme Court.

Section 1 thereof states

that the section is to govern:
"Any report, claim, tax return, statement or
other document or any payment required or authorized
to be filed or made to the state of Utah, or to any
political subdivision thereof • . . "
It is clear that that language was never intended to
encompass the court of the state.

"Political subdivision" is

no doubt intended to have the meaning given to it in the Governmental Immunity Act at Section 63-30-2(2) where it states:
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-43"The words 'political subdivision' shall mean any
county, city, town, school district, special improvement
or taxing district, or any other political subdivision
or public corporation~"
There is considerable authority that the courts have
inherent rule-making power and that the

legislat~re

cannot make

rules for the court any more than the court can make rules for
the legislature.

In the instant case,

necessary to canvass that body of law.

however, it is not
The legislature of Utah

and the courts have concurred in establishing the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.

Section 78-2-4, UCA, 1953, provides:

"The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has power
to prescribe, alter and revise, by rules, for all courts
of the State of Utah, the forms of process, writs,
pleadings and motions and the practice and procedure
in all civil and criminal actions and proceedings,
including rules of evidence therein, and also divorce,
probate and guardianship proceedings. Such rules may
not abridge, enlarge or modify the substantive rights
of any litigant. Upon promulgation the Supreme Court
shall fix the date when such rules shall take effect
and thereafter all laws in conflict therewith providing
for procedure in courts only shall be of no further
force and effect. Nothing in this title, anything
therein to the contrary notwithstanding, shall in any
way limit, prescribe or repeal any such rules heretofore prescribed by the Supreme Court."
Pursuant thereto the Supreme Court adopted the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.

Section 63-37-1, et seq., does not

on its face require that it be interpreted to include proceedings in court.

It does not mention courts and in accordance

with familiar doctrines of statutory interpretation 63-37-1, et
seq., should be interpreted in such manner as to be consistent
with Section 78-2-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.

See In re Utah

Savings and Loan Association, 21 Utah 2d 169, 442 P2d 929 (1968).
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Furthermore, in accordance with common doctrines of
statutory interpretation, the language defining the types of
instruments to be covered by 63-37-1, et seq., must be determined in accordance with the documents enumerated.

Section

63-37-1 states that: "any report, claim, tax return, statement
or other documents or any payment" is in effect covered by the
section and in accordance with the principle of ejusdem generis,
the "other documents" must of necessity be of the same kind as
those enumerated, and that would clearly not include court
pleadings, notices of appeal and the like.

(See Anderson v. Utah

County, 13 Ut 2d 99, 368 P2d 912 (1962].)

It would be a stretch

of the imagination to suppose that the legislature intended in
63-37-1, et seq., to "take away" what it had "granted" in 78-2-4.
Furthermore, the rule enunciated in Section 63-37-1,
Utah Code Annotated, and urged by defendant would be totally
impractical .and impossible of application in connection with
appeals to the Supreme Court.

That section would allow a liti-

gant, presumably at any time, to come forward with proof thathe
had mailed a notice of appeal (even a month or so late presumably), and if he could show that he actually mailed it, but that
it somehow did not arrive at court, he would still be entitled
to relief.

Under this procedure, litigants would never know

when their case had come to rest and the proceedings terminated.
Titles to real property would be left up in the air and other
mischief result.

See Norville v. state Tax, 98 Ut 170, 97 P2d

937 (1940) Head Note #7, page 177.
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CONCLUSION
We respectfully submit that the decision of the lower
court is fully supported by the law and the evidence in this
action and that the Court correctly determined that a directed
verdict was proper on the question of liability.
We further respectfully submit that the appeal of the
defendant-appellant was not timely perfected, that the Court
lacks jurisdiction, and. that this appeal should, for that
reason, be dismissed.
DATED the

--i

~:

/.

day of May, 1982.
Respectfully submitted:

GORDON A. MADSEN
ROBERT C. CUM..~INGS
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
and Respondents
320 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

Mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief of
Respondents to M. Dayle Jeffs, attorney for defendantappellant, at his address, 90 North 100 East, P. O. Box
683, Provo, Utah

84603, postage prepaid, this

day of May, 1982.

Attorney for Plaintiffs
and Respondents
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